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We are interested on assessing the effectiveness of the Bank of Greece (BoG) 
exchange rate policy, to achieve the objective of adjusting balance of payments des-
equilibrium, during the period 1983:1-1995:12. The traditional theory of the balance 
of payments adjustment process through exchange rate changes is used for this 
purpose. We found evidence, first, about the doubtful effectiveness of this policy due 
to the marginal verification of the critical elasticities condition; second, about the 
success of the exchange rate policy in the short-run, since the monthly data of 
bilateral exchange rates (USD, DEM, ITL, FRF, GBP, JPY) of the Hellenic Drachma 
(GRD) Granger cause the respective trade balances; third, about the significant co-
movement in the series which in the long-run, are driven by the same stochastic trend. 
We are much aware of the tentative nature of these conclusions. However, our 
findings suggest that the loss of the exchange rate policy was costly in the case of 
Hellas because an efficient policy sacrificed by the BoG to the European Central 
Bank (ECB).  
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1.  Introduction 
  In March 1998 the Hellenic monetary authorities, i.e., the Bank of Greece (BoG), 
devalued the Drachma (GRD) by nearly 15% against ECU and joined the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS). The exchange rate 
stability of a country-member’s currency within ERM at least two years before its 
application to joining European Monetary Union (EMU) it’s a critical criterion of the 
Maastricht Treaty. Indeed, the Hellenic candidature was carried unanimously by the 
European organs, in June 2000 so that Greece constitutes the twelfth member of the 
EMU since 1.1.2001. Thus, by definition the BoG, besides other issues, will turn over 
to the European Central Bank (ECB) its exchange rate policy too.  
 
  These developments for the whole EMU members have revived interest in 
Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory (Mundell 1961, Kenen 1969) which suggests 
that the basic criterion, for countries’ benefit in a monetary union, is the similarity of 
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their economic structure. It is obvious that this was not the case for Greece vis-a-vis 
its European “insiders” (Rubin and Thygesen 1996) partners. Most studies on OCA in 
Europe, focus on the measurement of shocks seeking to determine to what extent they 
have been symmetric rather than asymmetric (e.g. Bayoumi and Eichegreen 1992, 
Bini-Smaghi and Vori 1993). Here, we follow a different approach. Using the 
cost/benefit approach (e.g. Ishiyama 1975, Tower and Willet 1976, Allen and Kenen 
1980, Robson 1987), we focus on the loss of BoG exchange rate policy’s autonomy; 
hence, in a partial equilibrium framework, using monthly data for bilateral spot 
exchange rates of GRD against the six most important currencies for merchandise 
trade (Rj, j=USD,DEM,ITL,FRF,GBP,JPY) and the respective trade balances (TBj) in 
GRD value, our target is to assess the effectiveness of the BoG management of the 
GRD float, in adjusting one of its objectives, i.e., the trade balance dis-equilibrium 
(Apergis and Agorastos 1998). 
 
  Thus, the focal point of this research is to measure if there was an economic cost 
from the abolition of the Hellenic exchange rate policy to the ECB, given the degree 
of its effectiveness especially in adjusting the external merchandise dis-equilibrium. 
Our starting point is the verification of the critical elasticities condition (i.e., the well 
known as Marshall-Lerner condition) in the Hellenic case, during the sample period 
1983:1-1995:12 to adjust the balance of payments. From our data set we identified 
marginal satisfaction of this condition. Given these results, we proceed with doubts in 
evaluating the effectiveness of the BoG exchange rate policy, via the research of (1) 
the short-run dynamics of the series, using VAR modeling and (2) the long-run 
equilibrium path of them using co-integration analysis. In the former case we obtained 
evidence that GRD exchange rates Granger cause the respective bilateral trade 
balances whereas in the latter the series are found to be co-integrated and some of 
them respond from the deviations of their common stochastic trend. Taking into 
account the limitations of this research, i.e., the partial equilibrium framework and the 
Engle-Granger (1987) procedure for co-integrated variables, these findings seems to 
be interpreted as a statistical confirmation of the effectiveness of the Hellenic 
exchange rate policy in the short as well as in the long-run. In addition, these 
empirical results were robust in both sub-periods of the data set (i.e., 1981:1-1987:12 
and 1988:1-1995:12) when there was a regime shift (Kirikos, 1999) of the BoG, 
following the EMS functioning. 
 
  In turn, even though we are aware about the preliminary nature of our conclusions, 
it seems that the abolition of the Hellenic exchange rate policy due to Greece’s 
participation in the EMU, was costly, ceteris paribus, based on its verified 
effectiveness, during the sample period (1983-1995). 
 
  The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss methodological 
issues based on the theoretical background as well as its empirical verification. We 
describe our data set and we present evidence about the sample’s split as well as short 
run dynamics of the series in the third section. In section 4 the results of the 
integration and the co-integration analyses are presented. Concluding remarks are 
contained in the final section. 
 
2.  Methodology 
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  From the economic point of view, this empirical study relies on a particular case of 
the Traditional theory of Balance-of-Payments adjustment process, in which the 
monetary authorities (in this case, the Bank of Greece) intervene in the foreign 
exchange market to manage the spot exchange rate’s float (here, the GRD), so as to 
keep it consistent with their general economic policy objectives. By definition, the 
demand for and the supply of foreign exchange, as a function of the exchange rate are 
derived exclusively from merchandise trade, the disequilibria of which is considered 
as a pure flow one (first of all deriving from imbalances of exports and imports of 
goods and services), given the “ceteris paribus” clause. The managed or dirty float 
limited-flexibility regime (here, adopted by the Bank of Greece since the collapse of 
the Bretton-Woods) is also considered (expenditure switching/reducing policy, in 
Johnson’s (1958) terminology). Furthermore, the explicit assumption of neglecting 
money and the other financial assets as playing no essential role, for a small “open” 
economy, like the Hellenic one, (here, 1983-1995), may be justified by the foreign 
exchange control which was in force by the policy-makers, until May-1994.  
  
  Hence, we use the well known idea behind this traditional adjustment process, 
through exchange rate management: a change in the terms of trade, ceteris paribus 
(especially the national income and the stock of money being equal), brings about a 
change in the flows of exports and imports which hopefully adjust the dis-equilibrium 
in the balance of payments. It should be stressed that the ceteris paribus clause which 
is imposed when the exchange rate varies, constitutes an implicit assumption in this 
partial equilibrium analysis, and enables us to consider it (the exchange rate) as the 
sole cause of changes in the merchandise trade.  
  
  Thus, under these assumptions the critical elasticities condition (Bickerdicke 1920, 
Robinson 1937, Lerner 1944) can be obtained by differentiating the trade balance 
(TB) with respect to the spot exchange rate (R) and ascertaining the conditions for 
(dTB/dR)>0. Given the definitions of a) the balance of payments in domestic currency 
TB=PxX-RPmM where Px(Pm) represents export (import) prices in terms of domestic 
(single reference foreign) currency, X(M) designates the quantity of exports (imports) 
and R is the exchange rate of the country under consideration, b) the exchange-rate 


















where ∆ denotes a 
change; in the second fraction we use the minus sign to make it a positive number. 
Therefore, the condition is written as,  
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In addition if we denote by Em=RPmM  (Ex=PxX) the domestic-currency value of 














RR =− 1[ ( / ) ( /) ] ∆∆ (2) 
  
  For the Hellenic case, (see Table 1) our estimations are shown for the critical 
elasticities condition (Panel III) which were calculated on the basis of relation (1) for 
six bilateral trade balances (TBj, j=USD,DEM,ITL,FRF,GBP,JPY). This table also 
contains estimations for the three components of inequality’s (1); hence, in Panel I we 
state the ratios in GRD value of exports/imports expenditures [(X/M)j] plus the GRD’s 
yearly average growth rate vis-a-vis the six main foreign exchanges (∆Rj). In Panel II, 
the exchange rate elasticities of exports and imports (nx, nm) are described.  
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  The general conclusion is that the Critical Elasticity Condition are (1) marginally 
satisfied until 1987, i.e., during first stage of EMS, and (2) it is not satisfied during the 
1988-’95 sub-period when a strong Drachma policy was undertaken by the Bank of 
Greece. This may conduct us to expect that the managed float of the GRD should be 
ineffective in adjusting the trade balance, in the long-run; in econometric terminology, 
we expect the exchange rates of GRD and the associated payments balances not to be 
co-integrated. It is also to be stressed that these ex-post elasticities are in fact zero for 
exports and unity for imports (both with positive signs). These values mean that the 
devaluation of GRD was brought about with an analogous increase in imports’ 
payments in GRD while it did not affect the receipts from exports in domestic 
currency. The latter can explain, ceteris paribus, the deterioration of the balances for 
USD, ITL and FRF. However, the slight improvement (except JPY’s balance) of 
exports/imports ratio for DEM, GBP and JPY, conditioning on the above elasticities’ 
values, may be interpreted by the relative switch in the domestic customers’ 
expenditures from one country to another. 
  
  From the applied econometrics point of view, the study is structured at two levels, 
(the short and log-run) to evaluate the effectiveness of the exchange rate policy 
conducted by the Hellenic policy-makers. In the former case we apply the so-called 
Chow-tests to confirm the shift of the policy and then, in a VARs framework, we 
investigate the Granger causalities: from the exchange rates to the trade balances. In 
the latter, after the integration analysis suggested by Dolado et al. (1990), we work on 
Engle-Granger (1987) two stages co-integration procedure in detecting the 
equilibrium long-run time path of the variables involved. The well known bivariate 
VAR(1) system in standard form may be written as: 
TBj a a TBj a Rj e
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3.  Time Series Used and Short Run Dynamics. 
  The sample period starts in January 1983 and ends at the end of 1995 (1983:01-
1995:12), that is, in terms of EMS functioning, it covers mainly the exchange rate 
stability period (1987:01-middle 1992), the improved Bretton-Woods system at the 
EEC level (1983:01-1987:01), as well as the target zone period, after the deep crisis 
of September 1992 till July 1993 (middle 1993-end 1995). The monthly frequency of 
the data was dictated by our interest in examining in detail the dynamic 
characteristics. The data concern the bilateral (1) spot exchange rates of the Greek 
drachma (GRD) vis-a-vis the six main foreign currencies (Rj, j=USD, DEM, ITL, 
FRF, GBP, JPY) and (2) their associated trade balances (TBj). The “fixing” rates of 
GRD, at the end of periods, against USD, DEM, FRF and GBP was obtained from 
various issues of the Monthly Bulletin of the Bank of Greece (BoG), while those 
against ITL and JPY which are crosses through USD are found in the Main Economic 
Indicators of OECD Bulletin. As regards the data in GRD value of the trade balances, 
of export receipts and import payments, for all six currencies, concern unpublished 
records, of the three biggest commercial banks in Athens, submitted to the Hellenic 
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regulator (BoG
1) from which we found them (Stamatopoulos, 1999). Finally, lower 
case letters denote variables expressed in common logs.  
  
  The shift in the exchange rate policy of the BoG since 1988, due to the 
developments within the European Monetary System, is tested by the Chow test, i.e., 
we test the hypothesis that all the regression coefficients are different in subsets 
(1983:1-1987:12 and 1988:1-1995:12) of the data. The results of these Chow tests that 
are in favour of the split of the data in 1988:1 are shown in Table 2.  
  
  In Table 3 (tables 3a and 3b related to the two sub-periods, 1983:01-1987:12 and 
1988:01-1995:12, respectively) we report the empirical results for Granger causality 
analyses, using the vector autoregression (VAR) methodology (Sims 1980). Six 
VAR(p) systems are estimated for each sub-period. The main results are as follows: 
for the first sub-period, we find one-way Granger causalities from the exchange rates 
to the respective trade balances (Rj → TBj) in the cases of USD, DEM and FRF. In 
these cases, the lagged values of the GRD’s exchange rates are found to be significant 
in equations of the respective trade balances although the opposite was not confirmed. 
The same type of results were also found in the second sub-period; here, the Granger 
causalities (Rj → TBj) are found for the cases of USD, DEM, ITL and GBP, though 
we did not expect it to this extent because the BoG broadly declared a strong GRD 
policy since 1988. Thus, these findings confirm that the management of the flexible 
GRD by the BoG was successful in the short-run between 1983 and 1995. Therefore 
the facts that (1) the GRD enjoyed the privilege of not participating in the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the EMS, although it was part of the ECU, (2) the 
abolition of the measures of exchange control in Greece was concluded in July 1994 
and (3) the monetary discipline for Greece was delayed due to pure political 
disturbances from early 1989 to April 1990, enabled Hellenic policy-makers to 
exploit the devaluation policy in adjusting the merchandise balance of payments dis-
equilibria.  
 
4.  Co-integration Analysis 
  In the first step of the Engle-Granger (1987) testing procedure for cointegration we 
pre-test the variables for their order of integration. Table 4 reports the estimations 
applying the Dolado et al. (1990) procedure for univariate single unit root tests, given 
that the data-generating processes of our variables are unknown. 
  
  It is to be pointed out that, (1) in only three cases we find both variables, i.e., the 
TBj and the respective exchange rates, to be integrated in the same order; these are the 
USD, FRF and DEM cases, the first two are stationary, while I(1) is that of DEM, (2) 
in contrast, we discover that the cases of ITL, GBP and JPY are integrated in different 
order; hence, we may conclude that they are not cointegrated.  
  
  In Tables 5 (a and b) we proceed to the second step of Engle-Granger (1987) 
procedure for estimating the long-run equilibrium relationships between trade 
balances and exchange rates. Calculated values of DW statistics along with the critical 
ones, (Sargan and Bhargava 1983) are displayed in Table 5; hence, the null of no 
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of the respective foreign exchanges for traded goods and services. 
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cointegrated variables is binding, the CRDW criterion concludes in favour of 
cointegration in all cases. The deviations from long-run equilibrium, i.e., the 
estimated residuals are found to be stationary in the Engle-Granger tests for 
cointegration reported in Table 6. The latter offers us an additional confirmation that 
trade balances and exchange rates are cointegrated. 
  
  In the light of our investigation so far we proceed to estimate the error correction 
models (Table 7) using the residuals from the equilibrium regression. The main 
empirical results from the VECM’s estimates (Table 7) are as follows: first, all 
residual series approximate white noise. Second, the variables of interest, i.e., trade 
balances (TBj) and exchange rates of the GRD (Rj) are found to be co-integrated in 
every single system, in both sub-periods; the speed of adjustment coefficients are 
significantly different from zero, in the USD, ITL and FRF systems while in the 
remaining cases (DEM,GBP,JPY) only those of TBj equations do; consequently, in the 
former case both variables respond to a deviation from long-run equilibrium, in time 
(t-1), though in the later, (DEM,GBP,JPY) only the TBj are. In the second sub-period, 
1988-1995, the speed of adjustment coefficients were proved significant in both 
equations of the USD, ITL, FRF and GBP systems while in only one equation of the 
DEM and JPY systems, these of TBRDEM and RJPY. Thirdly, the signs of the speed 
of adjustment coefficients are in accord with convergence toward the long-run 
equilibrium only in the GBP model during 1983-1987 sub-period as well as in the 
DEM, ITL, FRF and JPY models during 1988-1995; these evidence, in particular of 
the first period, confirm previous research about the GRD’s divergence from its 
equilibrium time path, after an exogenous shock (Stamatopoulos, 2000); thus, as it is 
expected from the economic theory, in response to a positive discrepancy in error 
correction in time (t-1), for instance, the TBGBP tend to decrease and the gbp to 
increase (devaluation of the GRD).  Fourthly, from these co-integrated systems the 
following were found, (1) orthodox Granger causalities (Rj → TBj) in DEM, GBP and 
JPY models for the first sub-period while only for DEM in the second one, (2) feed 
back effects in USD (α=10%) and FRF systems during 1983-1987 though in ITL and 
GBP systems during 1988-1995 and (3) reverse Granger causalities (TBj → Rj) in ITL 
system over the 1983-1987 period while this one in the second sub-period was 
confirmed for USD, FRF and JPY models. This fourth category of empirical results 
may be interpreted as statistical confirmation of the monetary discipline applied by 
the Hellenic authorities during the exchange rate stability period of EMS; that is, 
rather than using the devaluation policy for the objective of Trade Balance adjustment 
they use a strong GRD policy to fight the high inflation rate aiming to achieve 
payments adjustment through de-inflation.  
  
  In total, the combined effect of the results obtained from the VECM seems to 
confirm the fact that the Hellenic policy-makers managed the GRD float to achieve 
their economic policy objectives, i.e., the trade balance adjustment until 1987 whilst 
the de-inflation from 1988 and later on. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
  From the foregoing analysis of monthly market data for bilateral trade balances 
(TBj in GRD value, for the six major currencies j=USD, DEM, ITL, FRF, GBP, JPY) 
and spot exchange rates (Rj) over the 1983:1-1995:12 period, we drew evidence about 
the effectiveness of the Hellenic exchange rate policy in adjusting the external 
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merchandise
2 dis-equilibrium. The later was the authorities' actual exchange rate 
policy objective over that period. This objective was achieved in general through 
intervention. 
 
  First, the split of the sample period at the end of the 1987 when it was observed 
that the BoG shifted the exchange rate policy (from the devaluation-competitiveness 
to the des-inflation-competitiveness through the overvalued GRD), which is 
confirmed by the appropriate Chow-tests for the whole set of six pairs (TBj-Rj). 
   Second, in a partial equilibrium framework as it is anticipated from the traditional 
theory of the balance of payments adjustment process, the critical elasticities 
condition is estimated. The ex-post exchange rate elasticities of the Hellenic exports 
(imports) were found approximately zero (unit), so that the condition was marginally 
satisfied. Thus, this evidence relevant to the economic theory makes us doubt the 
effectiveness of the Hellenic exchange rate policy, during the sample period.  
  However, as it is shown from the VAR analysis, in many cases (in USD,DEM and 
FRF during the first sub-period and in USD,DEM,ITL and GBP over the second one) 
the bilateral exchange rates Granger cause the respective trade balances, confirming 
the management of the GRD float as effective in the short-run. The wide-spread 
protectionism (other than taxes which were suppressed since the Hellenic accession in 
the EEC in 1981, e.g., subsidies of exports, financial obstacles enforced through the 
banking system to restrict imports as well as exchange control etc.) which was cut out 
gradually from January 1988 to July 1994 enabled the short-run success of the BoG 
policy.  
  Fourthly, from integration and co-integration analyses, the long-run effectiveness 
of the Hellenic exchange rate policy was confirmed the paired variables (TBj-Rj) in 
every one of the twelve estimated Vector Error Correction Models are found to be 
cointegrated. However, the degree of the above policy effectiveness was neither 
uniform for every j currency nor the same during the two sub-periods. The shift of the 
BoG exchange rate policy during 1987 affiliated with the course of the EMS country-
members toward the EMU, which Greece follows (BoG did not participate in the 
ERM till 1998 while GRD was part of the ECU etc) seems to be a fairly good source 
in explaining our evidences derived from the estimated VECMs and in particular the 
observed GRD peg to the DEM since 1988. In this context the effective monetary 
discipline of the BoG during the second sub-period is confirmed from the significant 
as well as with correct signs speed of adjustment coefficients in both equations in four 
of the six models.  
 
  Finally, during the sample period Greece and its European partners were engaged 
in parallel efforts to manage their economies in a convergent ways (first of all in their 
monetary policy) towards the EMU. Thus, the observed degree effectiveness of the 
BoG policy may be seen as a first approximation in evaluating the main economic 
cost of the Hellenic participation in the EMU, that is, the costly abolition of the 
exchange rate policy for a supra-national Central Bank (ECB). It is self-evident that 
this preliminary result came to light focusing solely on that particular kind of cost for 
participation the EMU. However, it is already  widely accepted that giving up 
exchange rate flexibility (though not against the USD and the JPY, in fact the EU may 
be able to better manage the dollar rate with its combined reserves than Greece could 
do alone) and interest rate flexibility are costs if there are asymmetric shocks. The 
                                                 
2 The concentration on trade balance is justified given the exchange control regime until May 1994. 
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point is that the benefits, lower rates of interest in a lower inflation area and reduced 
transactions costs, and possibly also greater exchange rate stability against both EU 
trading partners (fixed) and also against the USD and JPY etc. may well outweigh the 
above costs. There is no doubt that further research in this direction is required and 
especially in association with other late entrant 'periphery' countries (Portugal, Spain 
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Estimations of the Critical Elasticities Condition’s for Greece 
Panel I  (X/M)USD (X/M)DEM  (X/M)ITL  (X/M)FRF (X/M)GBP  (X/M)JPY 
AVG_8387  0,864 0,512 0,725 0,584 0,614 0,025 
AVG_8895  0,592 0,546 0,444 0,390 0,644 0,332 
DIFF.  -0,272 0,034  -0,281  -0,194 0,029 0,307 
  ∆usd  ∆dem  ∆itl  ∆frf  ∆gbp  ∆jpy 
AVG_8387  0,042 0,076 0,058 0,060 0,055 0,094 
AVG_8895  0,033 0,040 0,016 0,039 0,024 0,046 
DIFF.  -0,009 -0,036 -0,041 -0,021 -0,032 -0,049 
 
Panel II  nx_USD nx_DEM nx_ITL nx_FRF nx_GBP nx_JPY 
AVG_8387  0,026 0,022 0,032 0,018 0,032  --- 
AVG_8895  -0,004 -0,003 -0,004 -0,005 -0,004  0,007 
  nm_USD nm_DEM nm_ITL nm_FRF nm_GBP nm_JPY 
AVG_8387  0,982 0,991 0,988 0,989 0,988 1,004 
AVG_8895  0,999 1,001 0,997 1,000 0,999 1,003 
 
Panel III  Estimations of Critical Elasticities Condition’s 
AVG_8387  1,004 1,002 1,011 0,999 1,008  --- 
AVG_8895  0,997 0,999 0,995 0,998 0,996 1,006 
Note: The description of the data used as well as the split of the examined period at the end of 1987, so 
as to take into account the shift of the exchange rate policy by the Hellenic authorities, are given in 
Section 2. Where AVG_8387 (8895) is the average value of a variable over the 1983-1987 (1988-
1995) period while DIFF denotes difference. 
 
Table 2 
Chow Tests for structural change 
TBUSD, usd  F(2,152)=8,23 [4,03E-04]  TBFRF, frf  F(2,152)=22,98 [0E-05] 
TBDEM, dem  F(2,152)=11,9 [1,4E-05]  TBGBP, gbp  F(2,152)=40,98 [0E-05] 
TBITL, itl  F(2,152)=37,64 [0E-05]  TBJPY, jpy  F(2,152)=6,49 [1,97E-03] 
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Notes: Numbers in brackets show the marginal significance level. 
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Table 3a 
Granger causality tests  
First subset, 1983:1-1987:12 










































dem Î TBDEM 
TBDEM→ TBDEM  
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gbp → gbp, TBGBP → TBGBP 






















jpy →  jpy,  
TBJPY → TBJPY 
 
Notes: In first column the calculated value of  (ν=d.f. equal to lag length of the restricted model) and its significance level in brackets concern the Likelihood Ratio to test 
the null that the restricted model has the appropriate lag length. 
χν
2
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Table 3b 
Granger causality tests  
Second subset, 1988:1-1995:12. 











































dem Î TBDEM 
TBDEM→ TBDEM  




















itl Î TBITL 
TBITL→ TBITL  












































gbp Î TBGBP  























jpy →  jpy,  
TBJPY → TBJPY 
 
Notes: See Table 3a. 





Univariate Single Unit Root Tests 
(Dolado et al. 1990) 


















TBUSD  -10,5  37,1 -6,92 55,64  -3,2 -2,75  5,19 -0,86 I(0) 
TBDEM  -2,16 1,63  -0,25 2,44 -3,0  -2,96 4,51  -0,49  I(1) 
TBITL  -5,19  9,12 -4,32 13,65 -1,69 -1,66  1,55 -0,58 I(0) 
TBFRF  -4,45  -6,74  -3,71 9,95  -1,06  -1,48 1,32 0,67  I(0) 
TBGBP  -4,79 7,74  -0,98 11,6  -4,72  -3,87  11,12  -5,00  I(0) 
TBJPY  -2,57 2,53 2,36 3,58  -1,59  -1,11 1,67  -1,45  I(1) 
            
usd  -2,78 4,92 2,34 4,37  -1,78 1,92 4,51 2,29  I(0) 
dem  -1,36 7,21  1,1 1,67  -1,45 1,97  10,19 4,02  I(1) 
itl  -0,76 3,88 0,07 1,71  -1,85 2,23 5,86 2,56  I(1) 
frf  -2,4 6,12 2,27 3,04  -0,96 1,41 6,43 3,29  I(0) 
gbp  -2,29 4,54 1,81 4,15 -2,2 2,38 6,07 3,30  I(1) 
jpy  -1,87 5,91 1,54 2,57  -1,66 2,12 7,62 3,25  I(0) 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses of the first row denote DF and ADF critical values (α=0,05, 
n=100); namely those of  ôô, ôâô, ôì, ôáì and ô are drown from Fuller (1976) while ö2, ö3 and ö1 from 
Dickey-Fuller (1981).  The first four statistics
3 ôô, ö2, ôâô and ö3 were estimated from a random walk 
with drift and time trend   (for which µ denotes the constant 










1 ) 1 ( +
ì, ôáì and φ1)
4 a random walk with 
drift was used whilst the last one (τ) was estimated from a pure random walk. The optimal lag length
5 
for the ADF regression was chosen by adding lags until a Lagrange Multiplier test fails to reject no 
residual serial correlation at level 0,05.   
 
Table 5a 
Long-Run Relationships and  
Co-integrating Regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW) Test  
1983:01-1987:12 


























--- ---  ---  --- 
itl 
 
--- ---  0,64 
(3,05) 
--- --- --- 
                                                 
3 To test the hypotheses: ρ=1 {ττ}, µ=β=(ρ-1)=0  {φ2}, β=0/ρ=1 {τβτ} and β=(ρ-1)=0  {φ3}.  
4 To test the hypotheses: ρ=1 {τµ}, µ=0/ρ=1 {ταµ} and µ=(ρ-1)=0  {φ1}. 
5 For each of the three equations used these (L) were: TBUSD (0,2,4), TBDEM (11,5,5), TBITL (1,3,3), 
TBFRF (1,4,4), TBGBP (1,1,0), TBJPY (2,5,5), usd (1,1,1), dem (1,1,1), itl (1,1,1), frf (0,0,0), gbp 
(6,9,2) and jpy (1,1,1). 
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frf 
 


















1,67 1,08 1,46  1,60 1,43 2,56 
Concl.  ∃CI  ∃CI  ∃CI  ∃CI  ∃CI  ∃CI 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses below the estimated (OLS) parameters express the t-statistics while 
those of the first column below DW is the critical value (n=100, α=0,05) provided by Sargan and 
Bhargava (1983) to test the null of d=0 or ∃CI.  /
Table 5b 
Long-Run Relationships and  
Co-integrating Regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW) Test  
1988:01-1995:12 
























--- ---  ---  --- 
itl 
 
--- ---  -2,88 
(-7,57) 
--- --- --- 
frf 
 


















1,60 1,44 0,65  1,16 1,27 0,73 
Concl.  ∃CI  ∃CI  ∃CI  ∃CI  ∃CI  ∃CI 
Notes: See those of Table 5a. 
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Table 6a 
Engle-Granger (EG) Tests for Co-integration  
1983:01-1987:12 











































Conclusions  ∃CI  ∃CI  ∃CI  ∃CI  ∃CI  ∃CI 
Notes:  ∆Res1jα  denote the first difference of the estimated residual taken from the respective 
(j=usd,dem,itl,frf,gbp,jpy) co-integrating regression of Table 4a. The numbers in parentheses are the 
critical values reported by Phillips and Ouliaris (1990) for the EG-test for co-integration in the case of 
one regressor and a constant included in the already mentioned co-integrating regression. There wasn’t 
any need to apply ADF regressions, the DF ones had already been proved appropriate.  
Table 6b 
Engle-Granger Tests for Co-integration  
1988:01-1995:12 











































Conclusions  ∃CI  ∃CI  ∃CI  ∃CI  ∃CI  ∃CI 
Notes: See those of Table 6a. 
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Table 7a 
Estimated Error Correction VARs  
1983:01-1987:12 
Dep.  TBUSD   Dep.  usd    
smpl size 59  d.f. 54      smpl size 59  d.f. 54     
adj.R
2  0,2037 DW-st  1,8796 adj.R
2 0,9859  DW-st  1,7517 
 Coeff.  t-stat. Signif.    Coeff. t-stat. Signif. 
TBUSD{1}  26,979 3,4320 0,0012 TBUSD{1}  1,3913 1,8823 0,0652 
usd{1}  0,4129 1,7685 0,0826 usd{1}  1,0716 48,819 0,0000 
jpy  -0,593 -0,578 0,5655  jpy  0,3771 3,9064 0,0003 
jpy{1}  1,2741 1,2617 0,2125 jpy{1}  -0,398 -4,199 0,0001 
Res1USD{1}  -27,08 -3,434 0,0011  RES1USD{1}  -1,388 -1,872 0,0666 
 F-Stat Signif     F-Stat Signif   
TBUSD  11,778 0,0012   TBUSD  3,5432 0,0652   
usd  3,1277 0,0826   usd  2383,3 0,0000   
Dep.  TBDEM   Dep.  dem    
smpl size 59  d.f. 54     smpl size 59  d.f. 54     
adj.R
2  0,2130 DW-st  1,3386 adj.R
2 0,9976  DW-st  1,5382 
  Coeff.  t-stat. Signif.    Coeff.  t-stat. Signif. 
TBDEM{1}  1,0687 5,8801 0,0000 TBDEM{1}  -0,015 -0,857 0,3952 
dem{1}  0,9804 2,3005 0,0253 dem{1}  0,9008 20,783 0,0000 
jpy  -0,486 -0,763 0,4487  jpy  0,5451 8,4175 0,0000 
jpy{1}  -0,430 -0,590 0,5572  jpy{1}  -0,452 -6,095 0,0000 
Res1DEM{1}  -0,850 -4,286 0,0001  Res1DEM{1}  -0,001 -0,049 0,9606 
 F-Stat Signif     F-Stat Signif   
TBDEM  34,575 0,0000   TBDEM  0,7344 0,3952   
dem  5,2921 0,0253   dem  431,94 0,0000   
Dep. TBRITL    Dep. itl     
smpl size 59  d.f. 55     smpl size 59  d.f. 55     
adj.R
2  0,1232 DW-st  1,7274 adj.R
2 0,9923  DW-st  1,9511 
  Coeff.  t-stat. Signif.    Coeff.  t-stat. Signif. 
TBITL{1}  2,1428 2,4535 0,0173 TBITL{1}  0,7262 10,432 0,0000 
itl{1}  -3,237 -1,689 0,0968  itl{1}  -0,648 -4,243 0,0001 
dem  1,8022 1,6725 0,1001 dem  0,9289 10,814 0,0000 
Res1ITL{1}  -2,152 -2,434 0,0182  Res1ITL{1}  -0,736 -10,45 0,0000 
 F-Stat Signif     F-Stat Signif   
TBITL  6,0194 0,0173   TBITL  108,83 0,0000   
itl   2,8547 0,0968   itl   18,007 0,0001   
Dep.  TBFRF   Dep.  frf     
smpl size 58  d.f. 51     smpl size 58  d.f. 51     
adj.R
2  0,3469 DW-st  2,2400 adj.R
2 0,9958  DW-st  2,2640 
  Coeff.  t-stat. Signif.    Coeff.  t-stat. Signif. 
TBFRF{1}  -14,30 -3,302 0,0018  TBFRF{1}  -0,862 -2,695 0,0095 
frf{1}  -10,27 -3,365 0,0015  frf{1}  0,0200 0,0884 0,9299 
TREND  -0,037 -3,263 0,0020  TREND  -0,000 -0,775 0,4419 
dem  0,1628 0,0973 0,9228 dem  0,6294 5,0921 0,0000 
dem{1}  2,5327 0,8901 0,3776 dem{1}  0,3601 1,7127 0,0928 
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dem{2}  2,5909 1,5543 0,1263 dem{2}  -0,420 -3,416 0,0013 
Res1FRF{1}  14,340 3,3527 0,0015 Res1FRF{1}  0,8450 2,6734 0,0101 
 F-Stat Signif     F-Stat Signif   
TBFRF  10,904 0,0018   TBFRF  7,2649 0,0095   
frf  11,325 0,0015   frf  0,0078 0,9299   
Dep.  TBGBP   Dep.  gbp     
smpl size 57  d.f. 48     smpl size 57  d.f. 48     
adj.R
2  0,3693 DW-st  2,1597 adj.R
2 0,9879  DW-st  2,2990 
  Coeff.  t-stat. Signif.    Coeff.  t-stat. Signif. 
TBGBP{1}  1,2042 2,3358 0,0237 TBGBP{1}  -0,019 -0,752 0,4555 
TBGBP{2}  -0,172 -1,282 0,2058  TBGBP{2}  0,0181 2,6125 0,0120 
TBGBP{3}  -0,037 -0,321 0,7495  TBGBP{3}  -0,018 -3,030 0,0039 
gbp{1}  -2,258 -0,889 0,3781  gbp{1}  1,6031 12,282 0,0000 
gbp {2}  -3,543 -0,861 0,3934  gbp {2}  -0,934 -4,417 0,0001 
gbp {3}  4,9586 1,8171 0,0754 gbp {3}  0,3122 2,2247 0,0308 
jpy{3}  -4,046 -3,074 0,0035  jpy{3}  -0,019 -0,293 0,7706 
dem{3}  5,3783 3,4742 0,0011 dem{3}  0,0451 0,5669 0,5734 
Res1GBP{1}  -1,066 -2,096 0,0414  Res1GBP{1}  0,0072 0,2737 0,7855 
 F-Stat Signif     F-Stat Signif   
TBGBP  2,3532 0,0838   TBGBP  4,8463 0,0050   
gbp  3,9693 0,0132   gbp  441,38 0,0000   
Dep.  TBJPY   Dep.  jpy     
smpl size 44  d.f. 34     smpl size 44  d.f. 34     
adj.R
2  0,6271 DW-st  2,2470 adj.R
2 0,9965  DW-st  1,6132 
 Coeff.  t-stat. Signif.    Coeff. t-stat. Signif. 
TBJPY{1}  -3,120 -3,537 0,0012  TBJPY{1}  0,0117 0,8421 0,4056 
jpy{1}  19,034 2,3301 0,0259 jpy{1}  0,6881 5,3535 0,0000 
TREND  0,3317 4,2430 0,0002 TREND  0,0002 0,2025 0,8407 
dem  4,8677 0,4735 0,6389 dem  1,0184 6,2959 0,0000 
dem{1}  2,7472 0,1648 0,8701 dem{1}  -0,956 -3,645 0,0009 
dem{2}  -21,14 -1,947 0,0597  dem{2}  0,1933 1,1317 0,2657 
usd  -12,36 -1,389 0,1739  usd  0,3765 2,6882 0,0110 
usd{1}  17,725 1,3311 0,1920 usd{1}  -0,339 -1,621 0,1143 
usd{2}  -17,72 -2,102 0,0430  usd{2}  0,0339 0,2559 0,7996 
Res1JPY{1}  2,7805 3,3074 0,0022 Res1JPY{1}  -0,013 -1,048 0,3019 
 F-Stat Signif     F-Stat Signif   
TBJPY  12,513 0,0012   TBJPY  0,7091 0,4056   
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Table 7b 
Estimated Error Correction VARs  
1988:01-1995:12 
Dep.  TBUSD   Dep.  usd    
smpl size 95  d.f. 87     smpl size 95  d.f. 87     
adj.R
2  0,3629 DW-st  1,9774 adj.R
2 0,9848  DW-st  2,0317 
 Coeff.  t-stat. Signif.    Coeff. t-stat. Signif. 
TBUSD{1}  1,1340 3,8760 0,0002 TBUSD{1}  0,0669 3,1078 0,0025 
TBUSD{2}  0,0233 0,2203 0,8262 TBUSD{2}  0,0078 1,0008 0,3197 
usd{1}  1,4564 1,0835 0,2816 usd{1}  1,1893 12,034 0,0000 
usd{2}  -1,443 -1,068 0,2882  usd{2}  -0,309 -3,119 0,0025 
jpy  1,2469 2,0753 0,0409 jpy  0,0640 1,4480 0,1512 
itl{1}  1,4852 2,0952 0,0391 itl{1}  0,0185 0,3548 0,7236 
dem{1}  -2,144 -2,775 0,0067  dem{1}  0,0649 1,1431 0,2561 
Res2USD{1}  -1,044 -3,467 0,0008  Res2USD{1}  -0,059 -2,675 0,0089 
 F-Stat Signif     F-Stat Signif   
TBUSD  8,2046 0,0005   TBUSD  6,4357 0,0025   
usd  0,6013 0,5504   usd  307,19 0,0000   
Dep.  TBDEM   Dep.  dem    
smpl size 95  d.f. 88     smpl size 95  d.f. 88     
adj.R
2  0,2121 DW-st  2,0356 adj.R
2 0,9983  DW-st  1,7164 
 Coeff.  t-stat. Signif.    Coeff. t-stat. Signif. 
TBDEM{1}  3,0534 2,7433 0,0074 TBDEM{1}  -0,042 -0,610 0,5432 
dem{1}  0,9878 2,4091 0,0181 dem{1}  0,9987 38,750 0,0000 
usd  -0,122 -0,172 0,8632  usd  -0,123 -2,772 0,0068 
usd{1}  -0,622 -0,883 0,3796  usd{1}  0,1406 3,1728 0,0021 
jpy  0,3737 0,5462 0,5863 jpy  0,0949 2,2069 0,0299 
jpy{1}  -0,276 -0,413 0,6800  jpy{1}  -0,115 -2,746 0,0073 
Res2DEM{1}  -2,836 -2,505 0,0141  Res2DEM{1}  0,0366 0,5144 0,6083 
 F-Stat Signif     F-Stat Signif   
TBDEM  7,5255 0,0074   TBDEM  0,3726 0,5432   
dem  5,8035 0,0181   dem  1501,6 0,0000   
Dep.  TBITL   Dep.  itl     
smpl size 95  d.f. 89     smpl size 95  d.f. 89     
adj.R
2  0,7228 DW-st  2,0677 adj.R
2 0,9525  DW-st  2,0848 
 Coeff.  t-stat. Signif.    Coeff. t-stat. Signif. 
TBITL{1}  1,5530 6,9073 0,0000 TBITL{1}  -0,039 -2,005 0,0479 
itl{1}  5,3077 4,7665 0,0000 itl{1}  0,7022 7,2774 0,0000 
usd  -1,546 -2,264 0,0260  usd  0,1871 3,1599 0,0022 
dem  -2,188 -3,139 0,0023  dem  0,0882 1,4604 0,1477 
jpy  1,0254 1,9095 0,0594 jpy  -0,130 -2,795 0,0064 
Res2ITL{1}  -1,256 -4,960 0,0000  Res2ITL{1}  0,0418 1,9059 0,0599 
 F-Stat Signif     F-Stat Signif   
TBITL  47,710 0,0000   TBITL  4,0229 0,0479   
itl  22,719 0,0000   itl  52,960 0,0000   
Dep.  TBFRF   Dep.  frf    
smpl size 95  d.f. 90     smpl size 95  d.f. 90     





2  0,7459 DW-st  2,1408 adj.R
2 0,9876  DW-st  2,0998 
 Coeff.  t-stat. Signif.    Coeff. t-stat. Signif. 
TBFRF{1}  1,3097 4,7333 0,0000 TBFRF{1}  -0,217 -6,652 0,0000 
frf{1}  2,1954 1,6460 0,1033 frf{1}  -0,102 -0,652 0,5159 
dem  -0,679 -0,707 0,4811  dem  0,8462 7,4674 0,0000 
jpy  -0,829 -3,424 0,0009  jpy  -0,070 -2,463 0,0157 
Res2FRF{1}  -1,056 -3,214 0,0018  Res2FRF{1}  0,2052 5,2931 0,0000 
 F-Stat Signif     F-Stat Signif   
TBFRF  22,403 0,0000   TBFRF  44,248 0,0000   
frf  2,7092 0,1033   frf  0,4255 0,5159   
Dep.  TBGBP   Dep.  gbp    
smpl size 95  d.f. 88     smpl size 95  d.f. 88     
adj.R
2  0,7101 DW-st  2,0266 adj.R
2 0,9889  DW-st  1,8735 
 Coeff.  t-stat. Signif.    Coeff. t-stat. Signif. 
TBGBP{1}  0,6213 3,8234 0,0002 TBGBP{1}  0,0322 2,7335 0,0076 
TBGBP{2}  -0,154 -1,481 0,1420  TBGBP{2}  0,0043 0,5716 0,5690 
gbp{1}  2,4390 1,7765 0,0791 gbp{1}  1,2568 12,615 0,0000 
gbp{2}  -0,856 -0,620 0,5366  gbp{2}  -0,319 -3,192 0,0020 
dem{1}  -0,952 -2,365 0,0202  dem{1}  0,0577 1,9727 0,0517 
usd  -0,926 -2,582 0,0114  usd  0,0209 0,8015 0,4250 
Res2GBP{1}  -0,488 -3,177 0,0021  Res2GBP{1}  -0,023 -2,137 0,0354 
 F-Stat Signif     F-Stat Signif   
TBGBP  7,4298 0,0010   TBGBP  4,6334 0,0122   
gbp  10,917 0,0001   gbp  708,56 0,0000   
Dep.  TBJPY   Dep.  jpy    
smpl size 95  d.f. 87     smpl size 95  d.f. 87     
adj.R
2  0,5145 DW-st  2,0121 adj.R
2 0,9952  DW-st  1,8938 
 Coeff.  t-stat. Signif.    Coeff. t-stat. Signif. 
TBJPY{1}  0,4073 0,8144 0,4177 TBJPY{1}  0,0303 2,7221 0,0078 
TBJPY{2}  0,2688 2,6790 0,0088 TBJPY{2}  -0,001 -0,492 0,6234 
jpy{1}  -8,589 -1,857 0,0667  jpy{1}  1,0876 10,553 0,0000 
jpy{2}  8,9093 2,2095 0,0298 jpy{2}  -0,311 -3,471 0,0008 
usd  -2,441 -1,028 0,3065  usd  0,1409 2,6639 0,0092 
dem  2,8764 1,3513 0,1801 dem  0,1955 4,1217 0,0001 
itl  -1,193 -0,580 0,5629  itl  -0,176 -3,854 0,0002 
Res2JPY{1}  0,0082 0,0167 0,9867 Res2JPY{1}  -0,032 -2,923 0,0044 
 F-Stat Signif     F-Stat Signif   
TBJPY  4,0485 0,0208   TBJPY  3,7652 0,0270   
jpy  2,4554 0,0918   jpy  128,39 0,0000   
Notes: where Res1(2)j{1}, (j=USD,DEM,ITL,FRF,GBP,JPY) estimated residuals from the long-run 
regressions (Tables 5) for the first (second) sub-period, in time (t-1). 